sound: core: get_available_index() calls snd_ctl_find_id() without controls_rwsem (UAF risk)

From: 徐晗翔

Date: Sun Nov 22 2026 - 02:55:27 EST


get_available_index() in sound/core/ctljack.c walks the control id space
by calling snd_ctl_find_id() in a loop, but it does not hold
card->controls_rwsem. snd_ctl_find_id()'s fast path is itself lockless:
it does xa_load(&card->ctl_hash, ...) and elem_id_matches() reads the
candidate kcontrol's id. A concurrent snd_ctl_remove() holds the write
side of controls_rwsem, removes the hash entries, list_del()s the node
and kfree()s the kcontrol. get_available_index() can therefore load a
kcontrol that is being freed and read its id after the free -- a
use-after-free read. Upstream puts guard(rwsem_read)(&card->controls_rwsem)
around the loop in snd_kctl_jack_new(); this tree has no lock there.

This is a static report: I have a complete code path and an upstream
diff, but I did not build a dynamic reproducer for this particular
window. I am reporting it because the missing lock is unambiguous and
the required concurrent operations are reachable from userspace.

The detailed description:

* Test environment / affected version

Source analysis against mainline 7.3; no dynamic reproducer was run
for this case. The related sound/core report was produced on a 7.3
KASAN kernel, but that run does not cover MR-05.

* Root cause

sound/core/ctljack.c:31-46 (get_available_index):

static int get_available_index(struct snd_card *card, const char *name)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id sid;
memset(&sid, 0, sizeof(sid));
sid.index = 0;
sid.iface = SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_IFACE_CARD;
strscpy(sid.name, name, sizeof(sid.name));

while (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &sid)) { /* no controls_rwsem */
sid.index++;
sid.numid = 0;
}
return sid.index;
}

sound/core/control.c:843-868 (snd_ctl_find_id) documents that it
takes card->controls_rwlock internally, but the
CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP fast path does xa_load() and
elem_id_matches() without taking it; only the fallback list walk takes
read_lock_irqsave(). __snd_ctl_remove() (control.c:581-601) runs
under controls_rwsem write, calls remove_hash_entries(card, kcontrol),
then snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol) -> kfree(). Thus a lockless
xa_load() can observe a kcontrol that is about to be freed, and
elem_id_matches() can read it afterwards.

Upstream snd_kctl_jack_new() has:

guard(rwsem_read)(&card->controls_rwsem);

before calling get_available_index(); the current tree removed it.

* Reachability

- get_available_index() is called from snd_kctl_jack_new()
(ctljack.c:62-77), which is called by snd_jack_kctl_new()
(jack.c:426-456) and snd_jack_add_new_kctl() (jack.c:468-478).
- Runtime caller: sound/soc/ti/ams-delta.c:361 calls
snd_soc_jack_add_pins() from the tty line discipline receive path;
snd_soc_jack_add_pins() (sound/soc/soc-jack.c:155) calls
snd_jack_add_new_kctl() after the card is registered.
- A user with write access to /dev/snd/controlC* can add and remove
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_USER controls with iface
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_IFACE_CARD and an arbitrary name
(snd_ctl_elem_add()/snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(), control.c:662-678).
A control with the same name as the jack kcontrol is the concurrent
object.

Conditions: CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP=y (otherwise the fallback walk
holds the read lock and the UAF does not apply); a runtime jack-pin
addition path; a concurrent control add/remove with a colliding name.
The race window is small, but the missing lock makes it a kernel bug
regardless of reproducibility.

* Impact

elem_id_matches() reads kcontrol->id.name/iface/index from freed
memory: KASAN use-after-free read, potential crash or limited
information exposure. A second, non-memory-safety symptom is two
jack kcontrols choosing the same index; the later snd_ctl_add()
returns -EBUSY, so jack creation fails.

* Suggested direction

Hold controls_rwsem for reading across the get_available_index() loop,
e.g. restore the upstream guard in snd_kctl_jack_new() (the lock must
be released before snd_ctl_add(), which takes the write side).


Please keep me in Cc; I am not subscribed to the lists.

Regards,
Hanxiang Xu
xuhx@xxxxxxxxxxx