Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] pidfd: add task path ioctls

[Chen Linxuan]

On Tue, Sep 22, 2026 at 4:22 AM Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2026 at 8:47 AM Chen Linxuan <me@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 31, 2026 at 4:49 PM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > On 2026-08-31 10:59 +0800, Chen Linxuan wrote:
> > > > Obtaining a target task's executable, working directory, or root
> > > > currently requires walking procfs symlinks such as /proc/<pid>/exe,
> > > > /proc/<pid>/cwd, and /proc/<pid>/root.  That makes the operation depend
> > > > on procfs being mounted and visible to the caller, even when it already
> > > > holds a pidfd for the target.
> > > >
> > > > This series adds PIDFD_GET_EXE, PIDFD_GET_CWD, and PIDFD_GET_ROOT. Each
> > > > ioctl takes no argument and returns a close-on-exec O_PATH file
> > > > descriptor referencing the corresponding task path.  The new ioctls use
> > > > the same ptrace permission check and nonzero-argument rejection as the
> > > > existing pidfd namespace ioctls.
> > > >
> > > > The target task is sampled while holding its exec_update_lock. This
> > > > keeps the access decision and the task-state read in the same exec
> > > > critical section, preventing a concurrent execve() from changing the
> > > > credentials or target state between the check and the use.
> > > >
> > > > The first patch factors out helpers for acquiring referenced task paths
> > > > and reuses them in procfs and AppArmor.  The second patch introduces
> > > > scoped cleanup for privileged pidfd task access and separates namespace
> > > > lookup from namespace fd creation.  The final patch uses these pieces to
> > > > implement the three new ioctls.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Chen Linxuan <me@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > ---
> > >
> > > I really have difficulties forming an opinion on this. So this sounds
> > > very useful but it has implications.
> > >
> > > Right now, pidfd ioctls are available even in situations where the task
> > > in question would not be accessible via procfs, e.g., when procfs is
> > > mounted with "hidepid" options or similar. So this would expand the
> >
> > One point regarding hidepid: for callers that can pass
> > PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS, hidepid does not provide an additional
> > restriction. With hidepid=1 or hidepid=2, has_pid_permissions() falls
> > back to ptrace_may_access(..., PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS), and
> > hidepid=ptraceable uses that check directly. In addition, the
> > /proc/<pid>/{exe,cwd,root} links independently perform the same
> > PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS check in call_proc_get_link(), regardless of
> > the hidepid mode.
> >
> > So for these specific path lookups, hidepid does not block a caller who
> > would already pass the check used by the proposed pidfd ioctls.
>
> Agreed, I think with regards to hidepid there should be no issue here.
>
> If I try to come up with scenarios in which this could introduce
> additional danger, the main one I can think of would be: A task T1 is
> running inside a pid namespace and has a unix domain socket connection
> to a task T2 outside the namespace, with both running as the same
> EUID; T1 sets SO_PASSPIDFD on its socket to obtain a pidfd pointing to

Does SO_PEERPIDFD matter too?

> T2 on the next message sent by T2, then T1 uses that to get access to
> the mount namespace of T2.
>
> Christian, is there some mechanism that already protects against using
> something like SO_PASSPIDFD to get a pidfd to a process in a parent
> namespace?
> Otherwise, should we add something like a "pid_vnr(pid) != 0" check
> either in these new operations or in SO_PASSPIDFD?
>