[RFC net-next 04/15] ipxlat: add IPv4 packet validation path
From: Ralf Lici
Date: Thu Mar 19 2026 - 11:16:55 EST
Implement IPv4 packet parsing and validation, including option
inspection, fragment-sensitive L4 checks, and UDP checksum-zero handling
consistent with translator constraints. The parser populates skb
control-block metadata consumed by translation and marks RFC-driven drop
reasons for later action handling.
Signed-off-by: Ralf Lici <ralf@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/net/ipxlat/packet.c | 312 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 310 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ipxlat/packet.c b/drivers/net/ipxlat/packet.c
index f82c375255f3..0cc619dca147 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ipxlat/packet.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ipxlat/packet.c
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
* Ralf Lici <ralf@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
*/
+#include <linux/icmp.h>
+
#include "packet.h"
/* Shift cached skb cb offsets by the L3 header delta after in-place rewrite.
@@ -88,9 +90,315 @@ bool ipxlat_cb_offsets_valid(const struct ipxlat_cb *cb)
}
#endif
-int ipxlat_v4_validate_skb(struct ipxlat_priv *ipxl, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static bool ipxlat_v4_validate_addr(__be32 addr4)
{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return !(ipv4_is_zeronet(addr4) || ipv4_is_loopback(addr4) ||
+ ipv4_is_multicast(addr4) || ipv4_is_lbcast(addr4));
+}
+
+/* RFC 7915 Section 4.1 requires ignoring IPv4 options unless an unexpired
+ * LSRR/SSRR is present, in which case we must send ICMPv4 SR_FAILED.
+ * We intentionally treat malformed option encoding as invalid input and
+ * drop early instead of continuing translation.
+ */
+static int ipxlat_v4_srr_check(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iphdr *hdr)
+{
+ const u8 *opt, *end;
+ u8 type, len, ptr;
+
+ if (likely(hdr->ihl <= 5))
+ return 0;
+
+ opt = (const u8 *)(hdr + 1);
+ end = (const u8 *)hdr + (hdr->ihl << 2);
+
+ while (opt < end) {
+ type = opt[0];
+ if (type == IPOPT_END)
+ return 0;
+ if (type == IPOPT_NOOP) {
+ opt++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(end - opt < 2))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ len = opt[1];
+ if (unlikely(len < 2 || opt + len > end))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (type == IPOPT_LSRR || type == IPOPT_SSRR) {
+ if (unlikely(len < 3))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* points to the beginning of the next IP addr */
+ ptr = opt[2];
+ if (unlikely(ptr < 4))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(ptr > len))
+ return 0;
+ if (unlikely(ptr > len - 3))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ opt += len;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ipxlat_v4_pull_l3(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int l3_offset,
+ bool inner)
+{
+ const struct iphdr *iph;
+ unsigned int tot_len;
+ int l3_len;
+
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, l3_offset + sizeof(*iph))))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ iph = (const struct iphdr *)(skb->data + l3_offset);
+ if (unlikely(iph->version != 4 || iph->ihl < 5))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ l3_len = iph->ihl << 2;
+ /* For inner packets use ntohs(iph->tot_len) instead of iph_totlen.
+ * If inner iph->tot_len is zero, iph_totlen would fall back to outer
+ * GSO metadata, which is unrelated to quoted inner packet length.
+ */
+ tot_len = unlikely(inner) ? ntohs(iph->tot_len) : iph_totlen(skb, iph);
+ if (unlikely(tot_len < l3_len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, l3_offset + l3_len)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return l3_len;
+}
+
+static int ipxlat_v4_pull_l4(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int l4_offset,
+ u8 l4_proto, bool *is_icmp_err)
+{
+ struct icmphdr *icmp;
+ struct udphdr *udp;
+ struct tcphdr *tcp;
+
+ *is_icmp_err = false;
+
+ switch (l4_proto) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP:
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, l4_offset + sizeof(*tcp))))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tcp = (struct tcphdr *)(skb->data + l4_offset);
+ if (unlikely(tcp->doff < 5))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return __tcp_hdrlen(tcp);
+ case IPPROTO_UDP:
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, l4_offset + sizeof(*udp))))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ udp = (struct udphdr *)(skb->data + l4_offset);
+ if (unlikely(ntohs(udp->len) < sizeof(*udp)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ case IPPROTO_ICMP:
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, l4_offset + sizeof(*icmp))))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ icmp = (struct icmphdr *)(skb->data + l4_offset);
+ *is_icmp_err = icmp_is_err(icmp->type);
+ return sizeof(struct icmphdr);
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int ipxlat_v4_pull_icmp_inner(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ unsigned int inner_l3_off)
+{
+ struct ipxlat_cb *cb = ipxlat_skb_cb(skb);
+ const struct iphdr *inner_l3_hdr;
+ unsigned int inner_l4_off;
+ int inner_l3_len, err;
+ bool is_icmp_err;
+
+ inner_l3_len = ipxlat_v4_pull_l3(skb, inner_l3_off, true);
+ if (unlikely(inner_l3_len < 0))
+ return inner_l3_len;
+ inner_l3_hdr = (const struct iphdr *)(skb->data + inner_l3_off);
+
+ /* accept non-first quoted fragments: only inner L3 is translatable */
+ inner_l4_off = inner_l3_off + inner_l3_len;
+ cb->inner_l3_offset = inner_l3_off;
+ cb->inner_l3_hdr_len = inner_l3_len;
+ cb->inner_l4_offset = inner_l4_off;
+
+ if (unlikely(!ipxlat_is_first_frag4(inner_l3_hdr)))
+ return 0;
+
+ err = ipxlat_v4_pull_l4(skb, inner_l4_off, inner_l3_hdr->protocol,
+ &is_icmp_err);
+ if (unlikely(err < 0))
+ return err;
+ if (unlikely(is_icmp_err))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ipxlat_v4_pull_hdrs(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ const unsigned int l3_off = skb_network_offset(skb);
+ struct ipxlat_cb *cb = ipxlat_skb_cb(skb);
+ int err, l3_len, l4_len = 0;
+ const struct iphdr *l3_hdr;
+
+ /* parse IPv4 header and get its full length including options */
+ l3_len = ipxlat_v4_pull_l3(skb, l3_off, false);
+ if (unlikely(l3_len < 0))
+ return l3_len;
+ l3_hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
+
+ if (unlikely(!ipxlat_v4_validate_addr(l3_hdr->daddr)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* RFC 7915 Section 4.1 */
+ if (unlikely(ipxlat_v4_srr_check(skb, l3_hdr)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(l3_hdr->ttl <= 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* RFC 7915 Section 1.2:
+ * Fragmented ICMP/ICMPv6 packets will not be translated by IP/ICMP
+ * translators.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(l3_hdr->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP &&
+ ip_is_fragment(l3_hdr)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ cb->l3_hdr_len = l3_len;
+ cb->l4_proto = l3_hdr->protocol;
+ cb->l4_off = l3_off + l3_len;
+ cb->payload_off = cb->l4_off;
+ cb->is_icmp_err = false;
+
+ /* only non fragmented packets or first fragments have transport hdrs */
+ if (unlikely(!ipxlat_is_first_frag4(l3_hdr))) {
+ if (unlikely(!ipxlat_v4_validate_addr(l3_hdr->saddr)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ l4_len = ipxlat_v4_pull_l4(skb, cb->l4_off, l3_hdr->protocol,
+ &cb->is_icmp_err);
+ if (unlikely(l4_len < 0))
+ return l4_len;
+
+ /* RFC 7915 Section 4.1:
+ * Illegal IPv4 sources are accepted only for ICMPv4 error translation.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!ipxlat_v4_validate_addr(l3_hdr->saddr) &&
+ !cb->is_icmp_err))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ cb->payload_off = cb->l4_off + l4_len;
+
+ if (unlikely(cb->is_icmp_err)) {
+ /* validate the quoted packet in an ICMP error */
+ err = ipxlat_v4_pull_icmp_inner(skb, cb->payload_off);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ipxlat_v4_validate_icmp_csum(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ __sum16 csum;
+
+ /* skip when checksum is not software-owned */
+ if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_NONE)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* compute checksum over ICMP header and payload, then fold to 16-bit
+ * Internet checksum to validate it
+ */
+ csum = csum_fold(skb_checksum(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
+ ipxlat_skb_datagram_len(skb), 0));
+ return unlikely(csum) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ipxlat_v4_validate_skb - validate IPv4 input and fill parser metadata in cb
+ * @ipxlat: translator private context
+ * @skb: packet to validate
+ *
+ * Ensures required headers are present/consistent and stores parsed offsets
+ * into &struct ipxlat_cb for the translation path.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on validation failure.
+ */
+int ipxlat_v4_validate_skb(struct ipxlat_priv *ipxlat, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct ipxlat_cb *cb = ipxlat_skb_cb(skb);
+ struct iphdr *l3_hdr;
+ struct udphdr *udph;
+ int err;
+
+ if (unlikely(skb_shared(skb)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = ipxlat_v4_pull_hdrs(skb);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
+
+ skb_set_transport_header(skb, cb->l4_off);
+
+ if (unlikely(cb->is_icmp_err)) {
+ if (unlikely(cb->l4_proto != IPPROTO_ICMP)) {
+ DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Translation path recomputes ICMPv6 checksum from scratch.
+ * Validate here so a corrupted ICMPv4 error is not converted
+ * into a translated packet with a valid checksum.
+ */
+ return ipxlat_v4_validate_icmp_csum(skb);
+ }
+
+ l3_hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
+ if (likely(cb->l4_proto != IPPROTO_UDP))
+ return 0;
+ if (unlikely(!ipxlat_is_first_frag4(l3_hdr)))
+ return 0;
+
+ udph = udp_hdr(skb);
+ if (likely(udph->check != 0))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* We are in the path where L4 header is present (unfragmented packets
+ * or first fragments) and is UDP.
+ * Fragmented checksum-less IPv4 UDP is rejected because 4->6 cannot
+ * reliably translate it.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(ip_is_fragment(l3_hdr)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* udph->len bounds the span used to compute replacement checksum */
+ if (unlikely(ntohs(udph->len) > skb->len - cb->l4_off))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ cb->udp_zero_csum_len = ntohs(udph->len);
+
+ return 0;
}
int ipxlat_v6_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.53.0